I use field data to examine decision making by experts and crowds.
I am a postdoctoral researcher at Microsoft Research in New York City for the 2015-16 academic year. Beginning in July, I will be an assistant professor in the Operations, Information, and Decisions group at Wharton. I received a Ph.D. from Stanford University's Graduate School of Business in 2015.
I am a postdoctoral researcher at Microsoft Research in New York City for the 2015-16 academic year. Beginning in July, I will be an assistant professor in the Operations, Information, and Decisions group at Wharton. I received a Ph.D. from Stanford University's Graduate School of Business in 2015.
Working papers:
Expertise in the Field Fades in the Lab (with Justin Rao and David Rothschild)
We conduct field and laboratory experiments on the same panel of experts, measuring the internal consistency of their predictions 1) in the field, in their domain of expertise, and 2) on a conceptually identical laboratory exercise. Experts make internally consistent predictions in the field, both in absolute terms and relative to a panel of novices, but they exhibit markedly less consistency on the isomorphic lab exercise. Possible explanations for this fading expertise include low motivation in the lab and a failure to transfer skills learned implicitly in the field to the more abstract lab setting.
The Foreclosed Option Fallacy
Foreclosed options influence behavior even when they have no bearing on future outcomes. This paper documents a foreclosed option fallacy in NFL kickoff returns. I compare returns from just behind the goal line, for which the returner declined an option to achieve the 20-yard line with certainty, to returns from just in front of the goal line, for which no such option was available. Consistent with loss aversion around the certain outcome of the declined option, returners are 56% more likely to be tackled at the 20-yard line after the touchback option is foreclosed than when it was never available.
Impact Aversion in Arbitrator Decisions (with David P. Daniels)
An aversion to salient mistakes leads arbitrators to make mistakes more often, even where directives are clear, incentives strong, and post-hoc evaluation perfect. We study the choices of Major League Baseball umpires, who are directed to make binary decisions according to a single, objective criterion: pitch location. Using state-of-the-art pitch location technology, we examine over one million such decisions and find that every umpire in our sample distorts his directive by avoiding the option that would more strongly change the expected outcome of the game. This impact aversion is consistent with an avoidance of public scrutiny. Umpires face criticism from the public for mistakes that disrupt the course of the game; impact-averse umpires avoid scrutiny by avoiding game-changing options that could be mistaken.
Expertise in the Field Fades in the Lab (with Justin Rao and David Rothschild)
We conduct field and laboratory experiments on the same panel of experts, measuring the internal consistency of their predictions 1) in the field, in their domain of expertise, and 2) on a conceptually identical laboratory exercise. Experts make internally consistent predictions in the field, both in absolute terms and relative to a panel of novices, but they exhibit markedly less consistency on the isomorphic lab exercise. Possible explanations for this fading expertise include low motivation in the lab and a failure to transfer skills learned implicitly in the field to the more abstract lab setting.
The Foreclosed Option Fallacy
Foreclosed options influence behavior even when they have no bearing on future outcomes. This paper documents a foreclosed option fallacy in NFL kickoff returns. I compare returns from just behind the goal line, for which the returner declined an option to achieve the 20-yard line with certainty, to returns from just in front of the goal line, for which no such option was available. Consistent with loss aversion around the certain outcome of the declined option, returners are 56% more likely to be tackled at the 20-yard line after the touchback option is foreclosed than when it was never available.
Impact Aversion in Arbitrator Decisions (with David P. Daniels)
An aversion to salient mistakes leads arbitrators to make mistakes more often, even where directives are clear, incentives strong, and post-hoc evaluation perfect. We study the choices of Major League Baseball umpires, who are directed to make binary decisions according to a single, objective criterion: pitch location. Using state-of-the-art pitch location technology, we examine over one million such decisions and find that every umpire in our sample distorts his directive by avoiding the option that would more strongly change the expected outcome of the game. This impact aversion is consistent with an avoidance of public scrutiny. Umpires face criticism from the public for mistakes that disrupt the course of the game; impact-averse umpires avoid scrutiny by avoiding game-changing options that could be mistaken.
Conference publications:
What Does it Take to Call a Strike: Three Biases in Umpire Decision Making (with David P. Daniels)
What Does it Take to Call a Strike: Three Biases in Umpire Decision Making (with David P. Daniels)